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Abstract
Context
Recent public outcry has highlighted the rising cost of prescription drugs worldwide, which in
several disease areas outpaces other health care expenditures and results in a suboptimal
global availability of essential medicines.
Method
A systematic review of Pubmed, the Financial Times, the New York Times, the Wall Street
Journal and the Guardian was performed to identify articles related to the pricing of
medicines.
Findings
Changes in drug life cycles have dramatically affected patent medicine markets, which have
long been considered a self-evident and self-sustainable source of income for highly profit-
able drug companies. Market failure in combination with high merger and acquisition activity
in the sector have allowed price increases for even off-patent drugs. With market interven-
tions and the introduction of QALY measures in health care, governments have tried to influ-
ence drug prices, but often encounter unintended consequences. Patent reform legislation,
reference pricing, outcome-based pricing and incentivizing physicians and pharmacists to
prescribe low-cost drugs are among the most promising short-term policy options. Due to
the lack of systematic research on the effectiveness of policy measures, an increasing num-
ber of ad hoc decisions have been made with counterproductive effects on the availability of
essential drugs. Future challenges demand new policies, for which recommendations are
offered.
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Conclusion
A fertile ground for high-priced drugs has been created by changes in drug life-cycle dynam-
ics, the unintended effects of patent legislation, government policy measures and orphan
drug programs. There is an urgent need for regulatory reform to curtail prices and safeguard
equitable access to innovative medicines.
1. Introduction
Global health care expenditures have been rising sharply, and drug costs are a major factor.[1]
Recent public outcry about exceptionally high prescription drug prices have made this subject
a popular media and political topic. Discussion of drug prices has moved from an academic
and government level to a broader society level and now includes the evaluation of public
impact. The price of medicines was one of the campaign issues in the 2016 Presidential elec-
tion in the US [2;3].
Many examples of high drug prices exist and are frequently discussed in the media. They
include several types of therapeutic drugs and geographies. One often mentioned example is ima-
tinib (brand name Gleevec1), a drug for chronic myeloid leukemia,which tripled in cost after the
US Federal Drug Administration (FDA) allowed for a new indication. Novartis raised its price
from $31,930 in 2005 to $118,000 per year in 2015 despite a huge increase in the volumes sold.
The price hike occurred despite the fact that research costs for the new indication were included
in the initial price.[4–6] Also in the US, the list price of sofosbuvir (Sovaldi1) is $84,000 for a
12-week treatment, or $1,000 a pill,[7] which has caused health plans to refuse routine coverage
of this drug for hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection.[5;8] Sovaldi1 alone accounted for 64% of US
HCV-related spending in 2014, which totaled $12.3 billion.[9] Sovaldi1 could be cost effective,
since it prevents the ultimate need for a liver transplant, but the financial impact is too high for
US insurance companies to make it available for all patients with HCV infections.[2;10;11] In
Spain and Latvia, the cost of a complete treatment of Solvadi1 was noted to be “unsustainable”
by key stakeholders such as pharmacists and pharmaceutical policy experts.[12] The cost of an
alternative combination of ledipasvir/sofosbuvir (Harvoni1), marketed by the same pharmaceu-
tical company, Gilead Sciences, is comparable to a course of Sovaldi1.[13] But the high prices for
HCV drugs are not the exception. In another example, US patients suffering from cystic fibrosis
were denied reimbursement for a new drug–ivacaftor (Kalydeco1), with an annual cost of
$311,000[13;14]–unless their health worsened on older, cheaper treatments.[13] The cost of pyri-
methamine (Daraprim1), a 60-year old drug, rose from $13.50 to $750 per pill (a 5455% raise)
after Turing Pharmaceuticals acquired the distribution licence. This has further sparked public
debate.[15–17]. Additional price hikes in Mylan’s EpiPen1 from $94 ten years ago to $609 for a
pack of two have caused additional public backlash, protests and US Congressional hearings.[18–
20] The results of a recent trial,[21] which show that 74 patients needed to be treated for two
years with the new cholesterol-lowering Evolocumab (Repatha1) to prevent one cardiovascular
event, indicate that with the current list price of $14,523 per year, the prevention of one event
would cost over $2 milion.[22] These and many more examples of high prices for medicines,
however innovative, are untenable and frequently beyond the ability of individuals, health insur-
ance companies or even governments in high-income countries to pay[23].
Governments and health insurers are struggling with the dramatic increase in costs of new
medications.[7;24–26] In December 2015, the US Senate issued a warning report on Sovaldi’s
escalating drug price and its impact on the US health care system. The committee report said
the Gilead Sciences pharmaceutical company had set the price as a benchmark to “raise the
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price floor” for its future hepatitis C-drugs like Harvoni, thus knowingly reducing the number
of eligible patients for these superior treatments to cure HCV.[9] US congressional committees
have opened enquiries into similar drug-pricing practices.[27] Simultaneously, on the other
side of the Atlantic, the UK cost gatekeeper, the National Institute for Health and Care Excel-
lence (NICE), initially rejected reimbursement for two costly cancer immunotherapies—nivo-
lumab (Opdivo1) and trastuzumab/emtansine (Kadcyla1)—despite fierce opposition by
industry and patient groups.[28] In both cases, the costs were estimated to amount to £90,000
per patient per year.[29;30] With a number of better targeted immunotherapies–that fit within
highly promising precision medicine approaches–on their way to the market, the drug pricing
and funding crisis is expected to deepen and reach a critical level for even the wealthiest coun-
tries.[31] The German government is planning to curb companies’ right to set launch-prices.
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are working together to seek a common approach
to their price negotiations with drug firms. A January 2017 Lancet commentary co-authored
by the Dutch Minister of Health Edith Schippers stated that: “We need meaningful efforts by
both the pharmaceutical industry and governments to invest in new medicines, provide full
transparency on costs, prices, and who pays what beforehand, and respect the legal space for
governments to protect public health. If we don’t succeed in these efforts, we cannot guarantee
people’s access to innovative and affordable medicines”[32].
On average, countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) spend 17% of their health care budgets on pharmaceuticals;[24;33] in some countries, this
is even more.[25;34] For low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), drug expenditure can be a crit-
ical public health problem[35–38] with some drugs out of reach for even well-insured patients.
[26;39] In some cases, to prevent striking increases in premiums or taxes, regulators are forced to
limit access to healthcare,[13;24;40–42] which leaves patients without the best treatments.[43] Of
concern, is that the pharmaceutical industry might be tempted to view these high-priced models as
the direction for future drug pricing of new drugs that impact larger populations[13;44–46].
The prescription drug price controversy is not new. In the 1990s, there were comparable
heated debates on the high prices for interferons, paclitaxel (Taxol1) and HIV/AIDS medica-
tion.[1;47;48] Though the prices of these drugs were much lower than current new drug price
levels, the fact that taxpayers had helped to pay for developing those innovative therapies at the
time, generated public debate on fair pricing. In LMIC, where the need for HIV/AIDS medica-
tion was the highest, the fair-pricing issue was even more pressing, particularly with regard to
the problematic availability of essential HIV medicines[38;41].
Pharmaceutical expenditures are based on two factors: price and volume. This means that
regulation can either aim to lower drug prices, or reduce usage.[34;49;50] On the one hand,
there is a growing life expectancy (and aging population worldwide), while there are increasing
medical options for disease control.[51;52] Therefore, following drug innovation expectations
and usage growth statistics, it is likely that costs will continue to rise.[53;54] Many countries
are striving towards universal health coverage, with guidance from the global public commu-
nity,[55–57] to reduce individual catastrophic spending.[58] Although these countries are pre-
venting individual catastrophic spending by pooling risks and costs, a sustainable solution to
the problem of fast-rising drug costs is still necessary. The solution will require unprecedented
measures to prevent health care costs from spiraling out of control[59].
Many articles have been written about the high cost of drugs. Most seek to define the cause
of high drug prices in terms of government policies or industrial pricing strategies and propose
related policy measures to combat the phenomenon. This review takes another angle, and
presents a comprehensive analysis of the long-term dynamics of pharmaceutical markets, drug
life cycles and the sometimes unintended, counterproductive effects of market interventions
by governments and health insurers. The aim is to determine what has caused the recent
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exponential rise in drug prices, and what can be done in terms of measures around drug pric-
ing to safeguard equitable access to innovative medicines.
The article is structured as follows. First, drug life-cycle dynamics are discussed. Next, gov-
ernment interventions aimed at reducing drug prices and their consequences are highlighted.
Finally, we provide suggestions for alternative policy measures to reduce drug prices and
improve access to innovative and essential medicines.
2. Method
The prescription drug price controversy has been developing for several years now, but 2015
brought a significant change in public perceptions. Several new expensive drugs were intro-
duced, and even old drugs were subject to price hikes. To find causes and possible solutions
for recent price increases, a systematic review was performed.
Due to the wide selection of journals, PubMed was used as the search engine for peer-
reviewed scientific articles. The PubMed search was performed on February 24, 2017. The
search strategy was (Drugs OR medicines) AND (prices OR costs) NOT (Cost-effectiveness
OR Clinical Trial OR treatment), published between January 1, 2014 and January 1, 2017, in
English, and with full text available in PubMed. The articles were screened by TvdG based on
the title and abstract to determine inclusion, and then read in full. Additional scientific articles
were included based on the reference lists of selected journals since due to an inherent time-
delay, systematically searching for topic-related articles in scientific peer-reviewed journals
provided insufficient coverage of the controversy.
To include the most recent developments, additional searches in the databases of a select
number of reputable English-edition international financial and daily online newspapers were
performed. For this purpose, the Financial Times (FT), the New York Times (NYT), the Guard-
ian and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) were selected to ensure insight from both an American
and European perspective, and from both financially focused and general newspapers.
The newspaper articles were limited to those published between January 1, 2015 and
December 31, 2016. For the FT and the NYT the terms “Drug AND Pricing” were used in the
LexisNexis search engine due to the availability of articles. The Guardian was searched for the
exact combination “drug prices” using the Google-based search engine on their website. The
WSJ was searched with ProQuest, with “Prescription AND Drug AND Prices” as search terms.
The news articles selected by title only were all read and selectively added until there was a sat-
uration of citations and information. The result of the searches and selection procedure is dis-
played in Fig 1. To ensure the quality of reporting, the Prisma checklist was used.[60] This
study was not registered with PROSPERO.
Inclusion criteria
• Published in peer-reviewed journal or selected newspaper
• Published between January 1, 2014 and December 31, 2016 for scientific articles
• Published between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2016 for newspaper articles
• Published in English
3. Life cycles and market dynamics
The justification for high prices for pharmaceuticals can be seen as part of the changing nature
of drug life cycles and market dynamics. Further details on both these aspects are presented in
this section.
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Life cycles describe the market behavior of many products. Generally, the product life-cycle
pattern is represented by a “bell shaped” graph, a parabola, as exhibited in Fig 2. Though spe-
cifics can vary wildly, the general shape of the curve of investments during the drug develop-
ment phase, exponential growth of sales after registration and decline through competition
and patent term expiration is valid for most drugs.[61] Drug life cycles generally have four
Fig 1. PRISMA flow chart. Schematic overview of the study selection process. FT: Financial Times, NYT:
New York Times, WSJ: Wall Street Journal
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182613.g001
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stages. First, there is a testing and approval trajectory. Second, after the drug is introduced
there is market expansion, and the product is accompanied by growing expectations and drug
indication extension. Next, drug maturity with a high sales volume is accompanied by rising
criticism and disappointment regarding drug effectiveness and side-effects. Finally, there is
contracting use and limited drug application. In most cases, this is a gradual process that
involves the documentation of less favorable experiences and reports of the drug’s effectiveness
and adverse reactions in everyday practice. Thus, a drug’s benefit-risk assessment and the
resulting safety profile is under constant revision. Over time, newer and presumably better
alternatives gain attention. This is part of an evolutionary process of selection and adaptation.
Most brand-name medicines continue their careers as generics after their patents expire. On
average this results in a 20–25 year therapeutic life-time in ‘the doctor’s bag’–the portfolio of
drugs available to a doctor–due to therapeutic substitution and competition between branded
drugs and generics[62].
What we tend to forget is that therapeutic drugs are inextricably linked to a dynamic mix-
ture of opinions, practices and rituals and as such are important tokens of healing as a cultural
process. Doctors, regulators, health care insurers, patients and politicians, however, prefer to
believe that it is evidence-based medicine and not enthusiasm or belief about a particular drug
that makes a drug more or less therapeutically effective. Dan Ariely, a behavioral economist at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and his research team have shown that a 10-cent
pill doesn’t kill pain as well as a $2.50 pill, even when they are identical placebos.[63] This may
partly explain doctors’ and patients’ preferences for high-cost brand-named drugs over inex-
pensive, widely available, chemical and therapeutic generic equivalents[64].
3.1. Types of prescription drugs
This article refers to prescription drug prices, but there are distinct types of prescription drugs
and this requires clarification. First, there are drugs that are under patent, with an exclusive
producer and no direct competition. Then, there are generic drugs with an expired patent that
allows for production by other manufacturers.
Biological drugs follow the life-cycle patterns of small molecules or conventional drugs,
but higher prices are accepted and specific regulation of generic competition is in place. Onco-
logical drugs are a separate category, because high prices are historically more common,[26]
expected to rise,[5] and more acceptable given the severity of the indications. Laws are in place
to incentivize the development and marketing of orphan drugs, which means they follow mar-
ket dynamics that differ from conventional drugs. Finally, when the patent runs out, and other
producers can manufacture the same drug, generics are introduced. In the case of biologicals,
biosimilars compete with the innovator while following a specific set of regulations[65].
3.2. Patents and registration
The pharmaceutical industry is often characterized as a competitive sector in a free market,
where the total supply and demand determine market price. However, according to business
analysts, in a truly free and competitive market without patent regulation, it would be difficult
to profit from new drug development.[66] This is why governments protect companies from
competition during the life of a patent. In general, the term of a new patent is 20 years from
the date on which the application for the patent was filed.[1;40;67;68] This can be extended to
25 years.[69] In addition, in the US, the FDA can grant exclusive marketing rights upon a
drug’s approval, which is generally concurrent with the length of a patent. The FDA usually
grants new drug exclusivity for between seven years for orphan drugs[70] and five years for
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new chemicals, with an additional period of six months of exclusivity following pediatric
approval[71;72].
Patents are also granted for new chemical entities. This allows companies to charge high
prices once the drug is ready for marketing.[1;73] Patents then become public, which gives
other producers the chance to further improve and develop the drug.[41]
Patent timelines are limited, which provides an incentive for companies to shorten the drug
development phase or look for disease areas with less stringent trial requirements. For exam-
ple, there is more research in drugs for late-stage cancer than early-stage cancer, because of the
less demanding and shorter trial trajectories[1;74;75].
The number of patents a company files, or alternatively the research and development
(R&D) costs per patent filed, are often used as an output measure for the efficiency of drug
development and the future of a firm.[76] Since most patented molecules do not make it to
the market as an actual medicine, both datasets are incomplete representations of productivity
[77].
In debating the patent system, some analysts state that basic human rights like health and
access to essential medicines should be equitable[23] and should not be limited by property
rights.[1;6;78;79] Others use a utilitarian stance to argue that pharmaceutical companies are
for-profit entities,[40;73] and without patents these companies would not be incentivized to
develop drugs.[1] This difference in viewpoint is illustrated by the litigation surrounding pat-
ents and compulsory licensing (see paragraph 4.2.7) in LMIC[73;80;81].
Fig 2. Drug life cycle curve. General curve describing an innovator drug’s investments and earnings during R&D and market performance. The
life cycle phases are indicated above the graph, and the phases of the R&D trajectory are below the graph. Own work.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182613.g002
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3.3. Developmental phase and registration
Pharmaceutical companies must register new drugs, which requires clinical studies and safety
tests. This is a high-risk, high-cost and low-output endeavor. The odds of having a drug approved
varies from approximately 24% (for systemic anti-infective drugs) to less than 10% (for drugs
used to treat cardiovascular, gastrointestinal or metabolic disorders).[82] On average, it takes a
company ten years to register a drug.[41;68;77] Thus, companies have to decide on projects that
have a good chance of becoming registered drugs several years in the future.[83] The drug devel-
opment process requires investments, estimated at between $60 million to $2.6 billion,[6;67;68;
77] though most estimations are close to $800 million from bench research to prescription medi-
cine.[33;66;72;84;85] The wide range of cost estimates is due to the lack of clear data and various
methods of calculation, and depends on the type of drug and the trial data required,[72] as well as
the size of the company developing the drug.[86] Development costs are highest for large compa-
nies due to their relatively high overhead and marketing costs[1;76].
Historic examples illustrate what happens when the demonstration of medicine safety dur-
ing development is not adequately regulated. An exemplary case is the thalidomide drug disas-
ter that took place between 1958 and 1962.[24;71;74] This drug for morning sickness resulted
in malformations in the extremities (phocomelia syndrome) of thousands of babies born to
women who had taken thalidomide during pregnancy.[71] Regulatory reaction to drug safety
alerts often involves the introduction of more stringent regulations requiring more safety and
efficacy studies, which leads to more dropouts in the development process and an increase in
invested time and costs.[41;74] Regulatory agencies are criticized by many parties for being
either too stringent (delaying innovation and increasing costs) or not stringent enough (allow-
ing dangerous drugs to be marketed).[72] Arthur Daemmrich, a US historian, discussed this
tension between safety management and drug innovation and was the first to use the term
‘double bind trade-off phenomenon’[87].
The imperative of regulation makes it more difficult for smaller companies to register
drugs, thus limiting the number of firms with the critical mass and financial means to invest in
drug research. This situation limits viable competition from smaller companies[41] for Big
Pharma—the collective sector of large pharmaceutical companies. That is why most new drugs
that received a positive reaction from the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use
(CHMP) of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) between 2010 and 2012 were filed by
large (59%) or intermediate-sized (28%) companies.[88] Small enterprises are important dur-
ing early phases of development. However, in later phases, if the success of a new chemical
entity developed by a small company is likely, a large pharma company will often buy the small
company or purchase the licence for the new medicine[88].
R&D for medicines has been declining.[41;67;68;89] Higher investments, however, will not
necessarily fill R&D pipelines with new promising drug compounds. R&D has recently yielded
fewer drugs than in years past, since low-hanging fruits have already been harvested.[66;89;90]
Furthermore, there are many drugs with promising results in phase II settings that have not
made it to phase III settings.
Regulatory agencies allow drugs to be released to the market based on safety and effectivity,
but not with reference to price or cost-effectiveness.[70;91] This means the price and reim-
bursement of a drug are determined only after registration approval and insurance company
and/or government negotiation[91]
3.4. Post registration and reimbursement
Once a drug is registered for a specific disease indication, manufacturers can apply for reim-
bursement. Many public health care systems allow the government to control drug prices.
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Some base the acceptability of a price on the Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratio (ICER) and
budget impact.[10;83;92] This means companies have to assess the volume of sales[93] and the
price at which they are reimbursed, and then offer a price based on that estimate[90;94] Then,
negotiations take place between the company and the reimbursing agent or government to
determine an acceptable price for each stakeholder.
A drug’s reimbursed price can be lower than the pharmacy retail price or list price. This
makes patients aware of drug prices, since they will have to pay for the difference out of pocket.
Such pricing and reimbursement schemes can be a tool to make patients switch to cheaper or
generic drugs, and make manufacturers of high-priced drugs lower their prices to prevent
patients from making this switch.[36;59;95] Manufacturers argue that patient co-payments
can cause adherence problems,[96;97] especially for expensive[6;98] and psychiatric drugs.[99]
This means physicians and patients prefer drugs without co-payments.[78;100] To circumvent
this situation, producers have implemented patient-assistance programs, which are discussed
in paragraph 5.6.
Companies want to make the highest possible profits in each country by differentiating
prices,[40] but they also want their prices to be similar across countries and close to competi-
tors to reduce the incentive for parallel importation.[24;101;102] Governments worldwide
want innovative new drugs to be available as quickly as possible, so their population can profit
from them. High drug prices may incentivize companies to develop and launch their new
drugs faster.[1;40;73] On the other hand governments also want to have affordable drugs for
everyone at the lowest possible price, to reduce healthcare spending[1;5;78].
In the US, the government does not control reimbursement,[16;33;91] based on the
assumption that the free market will drive the pharmaceutical industry to compete, which will
result in lower prices.[92;103–105] Thus, pharmaceutical companies set their own prices,
which allows for market calculations aimed at maximizing profits.[106–108] As a conse-
quence, US prescription drug prices are among the highest in the world.[6;33;109] For the
uninsured, a cancer diagnosis is still a major cause of personal bankruptcy[110;111].
In general, the manner in which drug list prices are determined is not transparent,[14;57;
106;112] so critics are pushing for more transparency.[77;98;113] Some differences in pricing
between countries can be explained by differences in health care systems[4;93;114] and socio-
economic dynamics,[78;84] all of which lead to differences in ICERs. In some cases, a drug’s
price is based on the old standard of care plus a premium,[5;6] the uncertainty associated with
the drug[93] or simply the government’s willingness to pay.[92;115] Ultimately, a drug’s price
is unrelated to the cost of development[4;5;51] or a country’s gross domestic product,[12] and
only related to cost-effectiveness if the payer introduces this into negotiations[30;53;107].
3.5. Introduction and growth phase
When a drug is marketed, there is a level of market penetration.[61] It is important to the pro-
ducer that the drug is brought into use as quickly as possible, since a patent limits the period of
exclusivity and thus profit. Speeding up market penetration was historically accomplished by
advertising to doctors, pharmacists and patients (see Fig 3).[116] In the US, doctors are paid
directly for promotional activities,[112] though the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires
disclosure.
Direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) is controversial, since it increases demand, par-
tially through inappropriate prescription. Doctors will prescribe drugs that are not indicated if
they know they can satisfy their patients by doing so, or unnecessarily prescribe branded
drugs. This increases costs without improving health.[117] Therefore, this practice has become
illegal in most countries, but not in the US or New Zealand.[1;117–199] This situation makes
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it harder for drug companies to create demand for their products in most countries, and
reduces turnover in the early phase of developing a new drug.
In Europe, marketing to doctors and pharmacists is permitted, if it is medically substanti-
ated.[120] This requires more expensive studies, and careful wording of the marketing mes-
sage. Still, marketing is a large part of the pharmaceutical industry’s expenses. In fact, more
money is spent on marketing than on R&D[24;41;121].
To market drugs to doctors and circumvent this regulation, trials are sometimes used as a
marketing tool.[48] ‘Seeding trials’ are designed to ‘seed’ the use of a drug among patients and
physicians, while they often offer no scientific purpose.[122;123] Furthermore, medical centres
that want to promote an image of being at the cutting edge of science are willing to test the
newest available experimental treatments and compete for hosting profitable industry-spon-
sored clinical trials.[48] This was the case for interferons when companies were looking for an
indication for this new experimental drug.[48] Numerous promising new drug compounds
have followed suit[122;123].
A pharmaceutical company’s marketing push is somewhat mitigated by the increased ten-
dency to work with local guidelines.[25;50;73;124] This often improves the quality of care for
the patients, but makes it harder for new drugs to enter the doctor’s bag. In addition to the
cycle of updating those guidelines–which generally happens once every five years, or less fre-
quently[46]–new drugs have to show superiority to already available drugs. Furthermore, the
Fig 3. Stakeholders. A simplified, schematic overview of stakeholders and relationships in the pharmaceutical market. Own work.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182613.g003
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price of a new drug is often higher than that of older drugs that might be available as generics,
which increases the demand for proven superiority[41].
3.6. Mature phase
During a drug’s patent life, doctors and pharmacists play a crucial role in the choice for one
drug over another.[1] These professionals need to inform the patient about their pharmaceuti-
cal options, and a drug’s effectiveness and costs. This is why advertising aimed at brand recog-
nition continues during the mature phase of a drug’s life cycle[61].
Several studies have shown that if there are financial incentives for doctors to choose one
drug over another, the one that is most beneficial to the doctor’s finances is most likely to be
prescribed.[1;125] In the US, where Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement is based on a 6%
mark-up of the price of cancer drugs,[53;110;119] doctors have an incentive to select the more
expensive option.[1;5] This is another explanation for the high prices for drugs in the US. In
order to help patient and doctors, the European Society for Medical Oncology and the Ameri-
can Society of Clinical Oncology have developed frameworks to assess the value of new cancer
drugs[58;126].
To combat incentives to prescribe expensive drugs, some health insurance companies in
the US offer monthly payments of $350 to physicians who prescribe according to their guide-
lines, thus saving costs and improving patient health.[5] This scheme compensates a physician
for earnings missed by prescribing less expensive drugs[5].
In this phase, companies often attempt to have their drug registered for additional indica-
tions, thus increasing the number of patients, to increase their sales volume. A larger patient
base would logically make the cost per treatment lower, but this is often not the case[53;111].
3.7. Declining phase
Several countries around the world have implemented preference policies, aimed at generic
substitution.[1;127;128] This policy requires physicians to prescribe and pharmacists to dis-
pense the cheapest available version of a drug, often generic, unless a more expensive one is
medically necessary. This can be the case for drugs with a very small therapeutic window, like
Tegretol1 (containing generically available carbamazepine) for the treatment of epileptic sei-
zures.[127] For these drugs, the preference policy implies that new patients start on a generic
drug, but those who have already reacted well to a branded version do not have to switch. The
potential substitution rate differs per indication group[103;127;129;130].
Generic substitution reduces the length of the life cycle of patented innovator drugs, since
they are replaced by generics as soon as the patent expires. The time an innovator drug has to
generate income is thus reduced, which makes higher prices during the exclusive phase neces-
sary to generate the same turnover.
Doctors and patients are often hesitant to change the brand of the drug after patent expiry,
since they are familiar with the innovator and trust it.[69;96;99;128;131–133] This explains
why generic substitution only happens on a large scale if policy to enforce it is in place. In
some countries, generic substitution by pharmacist’s initiative is mandatory;[78;130] in others
it is prohibited[99;130].
Since roughly 2000, Big Pharma has been struggling with the patent cliff, a series of block-
buster drugs whose patents have expired. This has caused a significant loss of turnover due to
generic substitution.[66;67] The effect cannot be compensated for by new drug introductions,
since relatively few new blockbuster drugs have been introduced.[103] This means that in
order to maintain profitability, more revenue must be generated from fewer breakthrough
drugs, which has led to increased prices for innovator drugs and increased merger and
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acquisition activity within the pharma industry. Over the last two decades, 60 pharma compa-
nies have merged into just ten pharma companies. This consolidation has helped Big Pharma
gain more power to influence regulation and pricing policies while simultaneously diminish-
ing competition (see Fig 3)[134].
The patent expiry and substitution effect is expected to be smaller for the new generation of
biologicals, because these biological drugs are more difficult to copy. Also, a drop in price in
cases of biosimilar substitution is often just 20–30%,[65;85;135] whereas the price for conven-
tional small molecules can fall by more than 70%[85;99;131].
Large pharmaceutical companies employ several tactics to extend the life cycles of their
products, and reduce their loss of income due to patent expiry. Strategies to address this often
include improved formulations (e.g. Seroquel1 XR, quetiapine), new indications (e.g.
Zyban1, bupropion), chiral switching (e.g. omeprazole (Prilosec1)/esomeprazole (Nexium1)
or citalopram (Celexa1)/escitalopram (Lexapro1)), combining drugs (e.g. Harvoni1, con-
taining ledipasvir and sofosbuvir), changing to over-the-counter (e.g. Prilosec1, omeprazole)
and finally introducing an authorized generic[6] (e.g. atorvastatin, Lipitor1/Zarator1)[67].
Another option is the development of pediatric dosage recommendations and formula-
tions, which allows for extension of market exclusivity by the FDA for six months.[71;72]
Finally, ‘pay for delay’, the act of paying off generic competition so an innovator can maintain
market exclusivity, is fiercely contested by both the European Commission and US Federal
Trade Commission, but the practice has been increasing over the last few years[67].
Some drug brands are so strong that, even after the loss of market exclusivity, doctors and
patients continue to privilege them over generic drugs. Examples include brands like Viagra1,
Prozac1 and Aspirin1.[136] For over-the-counter medicines, in particular, branding is a rele-
vant mechanism to maintain market share, since consumer name recognition is a more impor-
tant factor in product choice when there is no medical professional role.
Fierce competition between generics can cause companies to offer prices that become too
low to be sustained by the offering company. Sustainability can be threatened by the rising
prices of raw materials and production costs,[137;138] which lead to a failure of supply and
shortages.[95;131;138] This situation can also force competitors for a specific drug to
completely retreat from the market, which leads to fewer producers[139] or even a new
monopolistic position for a generic,[137;140] as recently seen with Lanoxin1 (digoxin) and
Daraprim1 (pyrimethamine). The result is that even for generic medicines we increasingly see
steep price increases [141].
3.8. Changing life cycle dynamics, effects on drug pricing and profitability
Drug life cycle analysis indicates a trend of shortening life cycles and pharmaceutical compa-
nies experiencing more difficulty achieving high, sustainable sale volumes during the past two
decades than before. Since a company’s income is based on volumes multiplied by price
(equals value), the first strategy to maintain high revenues is to increase price.[142] Despite
regulated pricing, this practice results in drug spending growth matching overall medical
spending growth[39].
On average, the top ten pharmaceutical companies have a profit margin of 20%;[2] those
noted in the S&P 1500 have a net profit margin of 16%, compared to 7% for all other compa-
nies in the index.[119] This means that even though companies experience more difficulty in
achieving long-term high-volume prescription drug sales, the higher drug prices compensate
for the lower product turnover and safeguard Big Pharma’s high-profit profile. This is not sur-
prising, because pharmaceutical companies are for-profit entities that wish to maximize their
profits and increase share-holder value without breaking the law.[24;40;143] However, this
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approach means they may not automatically do what is best for society. Critics argue that
more regulation is needed to counterbalance Big Pharma’s only-for-profit motive and force
them to do what is best for all stakeholders.[15;53;104;144;145] Through a number of interven-
tions (some more effective than others) governments and their regulators have tried to direct
either the price of drugs or the availability of innovations. Government interventions to stimu-
late or curtail the pharmaceutical markets and the introduction of new procedural measures
concerning drug patent licences and drug registration licences are discussed in the next
chapter.
4. Drug innovation, regulation and pricing interventions
As stated previously, though the pharmaceutical market is often portrayed as a competitive
market, it is not truly a free market. In addition to the patent system, skewed economic
dynamics create further complexities. In free markets, a consumer decides on, buys, pays for
and uses a product, whereas in healthcare, a doctor decides and the pharmacy or hospital phar-
macy provides, the insurance company or government pays and the patient uses the product.
[142;146] An overview of the stakeholders and their relationships is given in Fig 3. Financial
incentives are not aligned with consumption, so companies’ pricing power is not related to
how consumers value the products.
4.1 Unintended consequences of innovation and measures to stimulate
drug safety
Drug regulation usually aims at making new drugs available while keeping costs down, how-
ever, there can be unintended consequences. For example, if drug production or distribution
becomes too competitive to remain lucrative, the market can become so consolidated that
drugs are no longer available.[140] Even worse, temporary or sustained monopolistic positions
can arise due to market failure which can cause an increase in prices.[104;106;147] Hence,
after specifically designing a policy to stimulate innovation and safety or reducing prices,
potential consequences should be carefully monitored.
4.1.1 Orphan and priority drug regulations and potential consequences. There are
cost-reduction strategies that could work by changing the trajectory of a drug’s development.
[53;68] The first option is to speed up innovation and regulatory approval, so that companies
have less waiting time before marketing a drug and thus enjoy a longer profit-generating post-
marketing patent life.[5] One way to do this is to accept surrogate parameters as trial endpoints
to prove efficacy, which saves time.[135] Another innovative option is to harmonize regulation
between countries, so companies only have to prove efficacy once.[135] However, because
drugs are not necessarily priced based on investment costs, the effects of this approach on drug
pricing might not be significant, or as we will see, harmonized regulations may actually be
counterproductive.
One clear example where regulation is in place to speed up innovation is the field of orphan
drugs. Generally, low patient volumes make it unattractive for pharmaceutical companies to
invest in the development of orphan drugs.[148–150] Fabry disease, for example, has a preva-
lence of approximately 1 per 100,000 persons, thus making it unattractive for companies to
develop drugs for these patients without further incentives.[149] That is why the orphan drug
regulation was designed.
The benefits of developing drugs with an orphan status are exclusive licensing for seven
years, faster assessments and lower taxes in the US. European regulatory bodies offer exclusive
licensing for ten years, lower regulatory fees and scientific advice.[148;150] Orphan drug legis-
lation has worked, yielding at least 73 drugs for orphan indications in the European Union
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since the law passed in 2000[151] and 335 in the US since the FDA set regulations in 1983 and
2002[152].
Another incentive for companies in the US that develop orphan drugs is a priority review
voucher, which is also available for tropical disease drugs. This voucher is awarded after a com-
pany develops a drug for an orphan disease and releases the patent. When applied, it allows
companies to request an expedited review process for a new drug, which can speed up the reg-
ulatory process by several months. This approach allows a pharmaceutical company to stretch
the patent period, and thus the mature, beneficial part of the life cycle of a subsequent block-
buster drug.[153] A well-used voucher could increase a company’s income by up to $300 mil-
lion according to some estimates.[1;154] The company can also sell the voucher to another
company that is about to launch a similar drug for roughly the same price[154].
The moral argument for orphan drug regulation is that society, and medical science in par-
ticular, has an obligation to pursue new therapies for everyone, including people who suffer
from orphan diseases.[149;152] The downside of this policy is the non-utilitarian outcome
that money is being used for diseases that very few people have, and that the same money
could have been used for more relevant research reaching a larger population[1;145;151;152].
Given that no price ceiling or maximum budget impact is imposed on an orphan drug’s
regulatory design, orphan drugs are often very expensive. Prices are unrelated to effectiveness
or prevalence, which means that regulatory bodies frequently label these drugs as not cost-
effective.[148;151] Also, the evidence for the effectiveness of orphan drugs is often lower in
quality than required for regular drugs, and more side effects are tolerated than for other drugs
[148].
In Europe, market exclusivity can be withdrawn after five years if a product has generated
adequate profit. However, this has not happened for a single orphan drug to date.[149;155]
Even for orphan drugs that have lost exclusivity, no generic producer has ever created a com-
peting product, and it is doubtful whether or not this would ever be attractive given the low
patient numbers[151;156].
Orphan drug regulation is an example of a policy working better than expected, thereby
increasing healthcare budgets. Companies have tried to abuse this regulation for profitability
purposes. For example, there was a request that malaria be designated for an orphan drug indi-
cation in Europe[71].
Orphan drug regulation is also used by pharmaceutical companies to register drugs so that
multiple indications–not always orphan indications–can be added. For example, Gleevec1
(imatinib) has been marketed for several orphan indications,[149] yielding a turnover of $4.7
billion in 2012.[6] Rituximab, the world’s second most profitable drug, also holds multiple
orphan drug indications, in addition to the use for common rheumatoid arthritis.[155]
Although this approach increases drug volumes, companies usually do not reduce prices.
[152;157] Finally, pharmaceutical companies split common indications into groups that are
small enough for their drugs to qualify for an orphan drug label[70;149;155].
Regulations for orphan drugs are quite effective, but should include compulsory price-ceil-
ing measures to prevent tax-payers from paying twice, first for some of the R&D costs and sec-
ond for reimbursement of overpriced drugs. Furthermore, the orphan drug label should only
be applicable if a drug has not been granted access for another indication already. Currently,
Revatio1 (sildenafil, also known as Viagra1, for erectile dysfunction) is being sold as an
orphan drug for pulmonary arterial hypertension[149].
4.1.2 The FDA’s unapproved drugs initiative and consequences. In June 2006, the FDA
announced a new drug safety initiative with the goal of removing unapproved ‘old’ generic
drugs with problematic safety profiles from the market. The FDA states that it uses a risk-
based enforcement program in order to focus on products that pose the highest threat to public
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health and “without imposing undue burdens on consumers, or unnecessarily disrupting the
market”.[158] However, the program has had unintended consequences. If a product is not offi-
cially approved by the FDA, the agency can require a New Drug Application from the manufac-
turer, which is reviewed to determine if the drug meets FDA standards. Inexpensive generic
drugs that have been on the market for decades are studied anew, drug applications are filed
and exclusive patent rights to sell the drug are given to the first manufacturer who meets the
new FDA effectiveness standard. This manufacturer can then decide what to charge—with no
competition. Exemplary is the patent flipping of the formerly inexpensive drug colchicine (less
than $1 for 30 pills), used to treat flare-ups of gout. Now, after FDA review, just one manufac-
turer has the patent rights to market colchicine as Colcrys1, and the retail price is almost $200
for 30 pills. How drug pricing measures could counteract these pricing strategies by the phar-
maceutical industry is discussed below.
4.2 Possible drug-pricing measures
There are many ways to reduce spending on drugs. However, all are based on one of four gen-
eral intervention options:[36]
1. Shift from expensive to cheap drugs, within the same class,
2. Shift costs towards patients or insurers,
3. Reduce drug prices,
4. Reduce total drug uses.
It is not clear which mechanism is the most effective, but authorities in many countries
often implement policies encompassing several of the abovementioned options. An overview
of possible regulations and the mechanisms through which they reduce costs are given in
Table 1.
Schemes to reduce drug prices are used most often to reduce overall healthcare spending.
For example, according to one calculation setting prescription drug prices 20% lower than the
current list price would increase the number of users who can afford the drug by 23%, while
decreasing revenues for the drug company by only 1%.[33] More examples with comparable
outcomes exist.[4] Of course, the outcome is completely dependent on specific market condi-
tions, prices and regulations. The general consensus is that reducing prices increases the num-
ber of users, and this could at least partially offset losses due to lower pricing. A popular
argument against paying less for drugs is that innovation would not be financially worthwhile,
and society would not enjoy the possible benefits of new innovator drugs.[77] This argument
will be discussed later on.
4.2.1 Biosimilar substitution regulation and resistance to substitution. Both the EMA
(since 2003) and the FDA (since 2010) have regulations for accepting biosimilars to bring
down the price of treatments by increasing competition without reducing safety.[65;72;159;
160] However, unlike the EMA, the FDA only allows for an interchangeability label if the man-
ufacturer has shown that a biosimilar drug has the same effect and safety as the originator or
for switching between them.[65] The regulatory framework for biosimilars is designed with
similar intent as regulation for small molecule generic drugs, but its effect is thought to be less
significant. This is due to a smaller price difference between the originator drug and generics,
[143;161] as previously mentioned. Research and production costs for designing a biosimilar
are significantly higher than for designing small molecule generics.[65;135;161] Thus, innova-
tors can prevent biosimilars market penetration by offering discounts on the original biologi-
cal[135].
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Furthermore, ongoing controversy on the interchangeability between biosimilars and origi-
nator drugs makes doctors and patients wary of using biosimilars.[159;162] It requires signifi-
cant effort on the part of reimbursement authorities to overcome this unexpected and rather
persistent unease about and resistance to the use of biosimilars, that is exploited by marketers
of the biological originator companies[159].
Pharmaceutical policy is often designed based on negotiations among various stakeholders,
but doctors are not always invited to the table, according to critics.[163] If the medical com-
munity were more involved in creating biosimilar regulations and substitution programs, the
effectiveness of regulatory and cost-reduction policies might improve significantly[159].
4.2.2 Engaging physicians and pharmacists in price reduction programs. As stated pre-
viously, physicians and pharmacists have a central role in determining which patient receives
which medicine, and whether the use of expensive drugs is beneficial for specific patients.
Table 1. Policy effects. This table lists the policies that are in effect in various parts of the world, their effects and their unintended consequences. EU: Euro-
pean Union, USA: United States of America, DTCA: direct-to-consumer advertising, UK: United Kingdom, LMIC: Low- and Middle-Income Countries.
Policy Location Mechanisms Effects Side effects
Patent laws Worldwide Increase innovation Gives an incentive for innovation Increased prices during patented
period, reduced transparency in
research
Orphan drugs EU, USA Increase innovation Many new drugs have been developed High prices, low quality evidence of
effect
Biosimilars EU, USA Shift drugs Availability of generic versions of
biological drugs
Concerns about comparable effectivity
and rare side effects due to fast market
authorisation
Development cost
reduction
EU, USA Increase innovation,
reduce price?
Faster entry of new drugs Lower quality evidence
Limiting DTCA EU Reduce use, shift
drugs
Reduced inappropriate prescriptions Reduced awareness of new drugs for
professionals and the public
Reference pricing Several EU
countries, Canada,
Australia
Reduce price Lower prices Best payers get drugs first
Price ceilings Several EU
countries, Canada
Reduce price Fewer price increases Higher initial prices
Value-based pricing Several EU
countries
Reduce price, shift
drugs
Decision making is more evidence-
based, and treatments are rewarded
for actual efficacy
Prices are set just below cost-
effectiveness threshold, limitation of
options
Preference policy,
compulsory generic
prescribing
Several EU
countries
Shift drugs, shift
payer, reduce price
Increased use of generic drugs Shorter life cycle of patented drugs
Stimulate guideline
adherence, pay for
performance
EU, USA Shift drugs, reduce
price
Better prices and quality of healthcare Limited options for treatment
Negotiation power
through monopsony
New Zealand Reduce price, shift
payer
Reduced prices for population through
increased negotiating power
Shift of costs to countries with less
bargaining power
Voluntary out-licensing LMIC Reduce price, shift
drugs
Lower prices in LMIC Counterfeit parallel trade
Open tenders for
exclusivity
Several EU
countries, Russia
Reduce price, shift
drugs
Reduces prices Drug shortages due to less dynamic
supply chains
Compulsory licensing LMIC Reduce price, shift
drugs
Makes drugs affordable for LMIC Counterfeit parallel trade
Incentivize physicians and
pharmacists
Several EU
countries, USA
Shift drugs, reduce
price, reduce use
Directs towards prescribing cheaper
drugs
Patients might lose access to more
expensive brands
Profit limitation UK Reduce price Lower profit margins, through lower
prices or higher investments
Could incentivise companies to spend
on less relevant causes
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182613.t001
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[133;163;164] Programs that provide financial incentives for prescribers to save on costs incen-
tivize physicians to be cognizant of drug prices and have the potential to reduce pharmaceuti-
cal expenditure gradually and permanently, by either rewarding when expenses are low or
enforcing penalties when expenses exceed indicative or earlier budgets.[34;49;165] After the
implementation of such programs, doctors are more inclined to believe that medical costs are
a relevant consideration in drug usage[166].
Just educating medical staff on drug pricing does not have a lasting effect. To change physi-
cians’ attitudes, the prices of drugs must be considered, and constant reinforcement and easily
available information is necessary. In one example, simply adding a sticker to indicate the
prices of anesthetic drugs per hour in operating rooms significantly reduced their use and
therefore, costs[167].
Another incentive to reduce spending is index pricing, which is similar to internal reference
pricing. Drugs are classified in index groups of therapeutically interchangeable drugs. The
prices for each group are determined based on the average drug used over the last period,
which is frequently updated. The pharmacist is reimbursed for the price that is given for that
index group, regardless of the drug that is actually dispensed. This incentivizes pharmacists to
dispense the cheapest version of a drug, preferably below the index price so the difference can
be kept as profit. This approach drives down the index price for the next period, thus creating
a downward spiral.[36] Downsides of internal reference pricing are discussed in the next
paragraph.
Finally, another way to reduce drug prices is for doctors to prescribe using the international
non-proprietary names (INN) of drugs, and the brand names only when a brand is strictly nec-
essary.[130] It is left to the pharmacist to dispense the drug based on the INN, so doctors have
no financial incentives to prescribe more or specific brands of drugs[100;164]
4.2.3 Reference pricing approaches. Reference pricing is a tool to set a benchmark for
reimbursements.[36;95;168] Of all price control measures, this is the one with the most evi-
dence for effectively reducing drug prices.[36;99] Reference pricing can be done in two ways:
internally or externally.
Internal, therapeutic or national reference pricing is based on comparing a drug to other
drugs with the same active ingredient or with comparable clinical effects within a country. The
maximum price of the new drug is then based on the average or lowest price in that cluster.
[1;55;99;163;168] This incentivizes companies to develop drugs for indications with no compe-
tition, particularly no generic competition, because that would bring the price down.[1;92]
However, internal referencing discourages development in existing drug classes.[1] Late me-
too drugs could be placed in a cheap class with therapeutic equivalents.[55;169] This method
of reference pricing only works by reducing prices and shifting patients towards cheaper drugs
[36].
External, or international reference pricing is used by most EU member countries.[78] It is
based on comparing a new drug’s price with other countries with a comparable economic sta-
tus,[36;59;170] or with differing economic status after which the outcome is adjusted to pur-
chasing power parity.[171] The mechanism of pricing used by a specific country, such as
value-based pricing, can also be a reason to refer to that country[55].
For example, Norway reviews nine countries and takes the average price of the three lowest
prices.[119] These prices are then regularly updated.[99] This approach often provides a
skewed picture, because it does not take into account undisclosed prescription drug rebates
and discounts that most purchasers receive for prices on the official list.[78;99;126;172] This
mechanism incentivizes companies to register in countries with the highest willingness to pay
first.[155;170;172] Countries with a lower willingness to pay could see a drug launch delayed,
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or no launch at all, to prevent other countries from adjusting their prices downwards[92;99;
170;173].
4.2.4 Value-based pricing measures. The ideal pricing model should include the health
and socio-economic benefits of a drug by deploying sophisticated out-come based compensa-
tion models.[105;174] The price of a drug should be proportionate to the added value in terms
of quality of life, life years saved or tumor shrinkage.[6;24;95] This would improve the value
per monetary unit spent on health care, and increase innovation in relevant areas.[90;175].
Currently, cost-effectiveness analysis is used in many countries as a factor in the pricing
of new drugs,[78;176] but often drugs and treatments that are not cost-effective are still
reimbursed, and sometimes by specific reimbursement funds like the Cancer Drug Fund in
England.[177] Vice versa, cost-effective drugs are sometimes not reimbursed at all.[178;179] A
major reason for this is the lack of standardization in the practice of value-based pricing.
Which factors are included and which are not varies, so value-based pricing is currently more
of an art than a science.[24] Data about the effect of such schemes are contradictory.[99] One
factor is that this policy has given a perverse incentive to drug companies to set high drug
prices for the new generation of innovator medicines that are in line with the cost-effectiveness
threshold (mostly in terms of quality-adjusted life year [QALY] and/or incremental cost-effec-
tiveness ratio [ICER] terms) that a country is willing to pay. This also explains the differences
in prices in individual countries, because cost-effectiveness thresholds differ across countries.
While not an official cut-off, the threshold for cost-effectiveness is set by the British regula-
tors at approximately £30,000 per QALY,[155;181;182] and £50,000 for end-of-life drugs.
[177;179] Other European countries use cost-effectiveness thresholds that can vary between
€10,000 and €50,000 per QALY.[6] After extensive analysis, the total British health care system
was found to provide care at £13,000 per QALY, which was much cheaper than many drugs.
[181;182] This means that money would be spent more effectively on parts of the system other
than high-priced innovator drugs.[177] Thus, the costs of high drug expenditures place a
heavy burden on the health care system and may displace other high-quality healthcare ser-
vices[178;181;183].
Another practical difficulty in value-based pricing is a drug’s indication. For example, Tar-
ceva1 (erlotinib) is more effective for lung cancer (extends survival by 3.5 months longer than
chemotherapy) than for pancreatic cancer (extended survival by two weeks versus placebo).
Although the price is the same for both indications, Tarceva1 clearly creates less value for pan-
creatic cancer patients.[110;180] Italy has an indication-specific pricing system to address this.
Other EU member states and the US, struggle to implement a similar system[115;180].
Some ways to ensure that a drug is priced according to its ‘true’ value are: risk-sharing pric-
ing, pay-for-performance pricing or outcome-based pricing. These pricing schemes allow gov-
ernments and companies to renegotiate a drug’s price based on its real-life performance in
terms of effectiveness, sale volumes or cost-effectiveness.[56;99;185] In this way, companies
have an interest in the real-life therapy outcomes (in terms of effectiveness), and not just the
drug’s performance in clinical trials (in terms of efficacy). For example, companies could offer
a drug at a reduced (or no) cost and receive annuity-style payments if a drug reduces hospitali-
zations after approval.[2;169;180;186] Examples of outcome-based pricing exist, though only
for specific indications and small populations.[169;180] Tracking the results in the real world
is also a difficult administrative assignment.[187] However, this scheme has recently been
implemented for several larger indications, such as for the effectiveness of a new cholesterol-
lowering drug[187;188] and for the hepatitis drug Sovaldi1 in Japan based on volume[189].
4.2.5 Setting price and profit ceilings. Another method of controlling drug pricing is to
set price ceilings in various forms. For example, to combat the high prices of generic drugs in
Canada, the government has recently negotiated a fixed price ceiling for six of the most used
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generic drugs.[190] This one-size-fits-all approach might still result in overpricing for some of
the six, and be too low to supply the entire market for others. A lower price could probably be
negotiated through alternative tactics, like an open-tender invitation, but the several Canadian
states failed to agree on an alliance for bulk purchasing[190].
In the UK, the government signed an agreement with the pharmaceutical industry that lim-
its increases in spending on branded medicines to below 2% per year. If more is spent, the
industry has to reimburse the government.[114;119;183] Companies that did not sign this
agreement are subject to direct price control[114].
One more option is to introduce upward price rigidity, by prohibiting increases in drug
prices.[93;119] In the US, it is industry practice to increase the list prices of marketed drugs at
least yearly by substantial amounts, synchronized with the competition.[146;191;192] Canada,
however, only allows drug prices to rise with inflation.[119] This causes companies to set high
initial prices, especially when the sales volume is uncertain[93].
A rather alternate approach is limiting companies’ ability to make high profits. An example
of this is the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) in the UK.[36] If profits exceed
a percentage agreed on after negotiations, a company must reduce prices, delay price increases
or repay the excess to the Department of Health[36].
This approach is designed to be an incentive for pharmaceutical companies to either reduce
the prices of their drugs, or invest more of their income in research. Conversely, it could also
incentivize companies to spend more money on areas that are not relevant to reduce profit
and avoid paying the Department of Health.
Partnerships between companies and charity foundations can help direct pharmaceutical
research towards a needy cause. For example, the GlaxoSmithKline–PATH Malaria Vaccine Ini-
tiative partnership yielded Mosquirix, the first malaria vaccine.[193;194] The partnership
included a payment of $200m from the PATH Malaria Vaccine Initiative, backed by the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation, to help fund pediatric trials.[195] The price of the drug was agreed to
be the costs plus 5%, which is the same price as an insecticide-treated bed net, so that it would be
available for those in need.[193;194] The profit is then reinvested in more malaria research[194].
4.2.6 Lowering prices through open-tender invitation and negotiations. Many coun-
tries use open tenders to lower prices.[55] They invite manufacturers or wholesalers[55] to
propose a confidential price for which they can guarantee to exclusively deliver a specific drug
(e.g. simvastatin) or a drug in the same class (e.g. any statin) for the entire market for a term
(often two years). The supplier or suppliers who offer the lowest price receive the contract, and
secure income during the contract period[99].
This approach effectively reduces drug prices, since generic drug manufacturers are stimu-
lated to offer the lowest, but still profitable price. However, open tenders require a market size
that is significant enough for companies to be interested, enough generic producers to create
competition[50] and an agreement on the contract conditions[190].
A downside to this market exclusivity for generics is the risk of shortages if the winning
company fails to supply.[161;190] For companies losing a bid, it could be difficult to offer a
competitive price in the next round due to loss of capacity, which reduces competition and
creates new monopolies[55].
Drug prices are often negotiated between national governments and companies, based on a
reference price or a figure based on a drug’s cost-effectiveness and budget impact.[99] As for
many schemes, increasing the number of patients for whom negotiations are held is thought to
increase bargaining power and decrease prices, since companies are then less likely to deflect a
low offer due to fears of losing market share.[84;190;196] New Zealand implemented a phar-
maceutical management agency to have a single negotiator for the entire population, but not
all countries are so organized.[78] For example, in the US, Medicare is not allowed to negotiate
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for drug prices[119;197]; if a drug is approved and prescribed, Medicare has to cover it, so its
bargaining power is limited.[119] Other players in the highly fragmented US market are small,
thus reducing everyone’s negotiating power[98].
An important downside to negotiating lower prices on a health care provider level or
national level is that this might indirectly increase prices for other providers and countries,
who have smaller health care budgets, which results in a weaker position to negotiate[1;145]
4.2.7 Transnational licensing and pricing frameworks. To increase access to drugs that
are on patent and expensive, but necessary in LMIC, these countries’ authorities can choose to
issue compulsory licences as allowed by the World Health Organization (WHO).[79;198] This
means that the authorities recognize the drug patents, but are allowed to have local generic
manufacturers produce the same drugs, without fearing claims of patent infringement, or they
can import the drug from another generic manufacturer.[7;56;79;81] This reduces the costs of
a new drug dramatically,[171] though other options like international procurement seem to
offer a better discount. Unfortunately, this approach is also administratively cumbersome,
since in general, it applies to one drug at a time,[56] and could result in other innovators with-
drawing their drug from the market.[199] However, compulsory licensing can be used success-
fully as part of a strategy to reduce prices offered by the originator[56;79;81;199].
International procurement is based on collective price negotiations between an innovative
company and a union of LMIC. This approach leads to lower prices and more accessibility
than compulsory licensing.[81] Lower prices can be achieved through voluntary out-licensing,
[73] wherein the originator allows a generic manufacturer to produce the drug at reduced
costs in exchange for a royalty. One example is the out-licensing of Harvoni1 (containing
sofosbuvir and ledipasvir), which Gilead Sciences gave to an Indian manufacturer to produce
for 91 LMIC, against a royalty of 7%.81].
High-income countries can also benefit from forming a union to increase bargaining power.
For example, The Netherlands and Belgium recently signed an agreement to negotiate process for
orphan drugs as a block. Several EU-countries have followed this example and joined the agree-
ment, and some pharmaceutical companies have indicated their willingness to cooperate[150].
A more utopian option to regulate drug pricing is the proposal of a tiered pricing frame-
work.[79;80] This would put a global public body, such as the WHO, in charge of regulating
prices of patented drugs worldwide. It would set prices for countries based on income, disease
burden and possibly the rates of out-of-pocket payments. This would differentiate prices for
rich and poor countries, and achieve fairer drug prices for consumers on a global scale.
Difficulties in the execution of this plan are to obtain international consent on the rules and
calculations, and prevent leakage into other markets through parallel trade. Also patent rights
would have to be equally respected and be applicable for the same terms, since it would be a
void policy if patent-infringing cheaper generic drugs were available.[80] Analyses of existing
systems with a comparable design in LMIC have shown increased profits for pharmaceutical
companies and an increased availability of medical innovations[80].
A comparable idea is that a global fund financed by governments would reward companies,
based on a share of the contribution they make to global health with all their products. In
exchange, those companies would have to manufacture a drug at the lowest feasible price.
[1;200] Unfortunately, this approach would be extremely difficult to implement and measure.
5. Discussion
Taking into account the complex and interconnected dynamics of drug life cycles, pricing and
intervention policies, several issues are worth mentioning and questioning. Recurring argu-
ments in the drug pricing debate are now presented for discussion.
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5.1. R&D through merger and acquisition
Companies are demonstrating a shift from in-house R&D to cheaper merger and acquisition-
based development to fill the pipeline.[41;42;104;201] This shift is due to the reduced efficiency
of in-house research,[86] and transfers the risk of failing research from big companies to small
startups. In this new format, small startups go bankrupt when the research does not yield a
profitable product, so that large companies don’t have to suffer the losses. In the case of a suc-
cessful start-up, larger companies simply buy the licence or the entire company. In the end
risk is shifted from big manufacturers to investors and governments who have supported those
startups. Although this business strategy is understandable in economic terms, it provokes per-
verse effects in the pharmaceutical marketplace that require new forms of regulation.
Valeant,[45;114;202] Turing and Amedra [197] are examples of companies that are mostly
focused on buying profitable products, instead of performing in-house R&D. Another example
is Gilead Sciences, which bought sofosbuvir (Sovaldi1) from Pharmasset, and marketed the
drug at double the cost that Pharmasset had intended to charge.[203] We seriously doubt the
long-term viability of investor-centered business strategy[147;204].
Some generics are only produced by a couple of companies, so it is possible to buy all the
drug rights and drastically raise prices.[16;140;184] This practice allows for a monopoly until
competitors succeed in starting production as well. A major delay in this is the processing time
for generic approvals, which is approximately ten months.[140] Many of the recent overnight
increases in drug prices have been caused by this tactic that closely resembles a hedge fund
strategy, rather than a pharmaceutical one.[16;200] This strategy was used for Daraprim1,
[15;16] albendazole,[197] Aloquin,[20] doxycycline and thalidomide[140].
5.2. Patent law revision and stimulating public-private partnerships
The patent system is often blamed for high prices, because it limits competition and helps cre-
ate monopolies. There certainly is an urgent need to revise the patent system in order to stimu-
late true innovation and prevent surrogate innovation as well as abuse of the patent system by
a pharmaceutical industry that increasingly seeks to exploit the re-patenting loophole.[205]
Unfortunately, removing the patent system completely would significantly reduce companies’
incentive to invest in research, so other solutions are required.[41] An alternative trajectory
might be to have all drug research paid for by public money, in the same way that outcomes–
prescription drugs–are currently paid for by public money. Academic institutions already per-
form a significant portion of new drug development, but currently lack the funds, capacity and
incentives to develop a drug completely without support.[41;206] Partnerships between com-
panies, governments, research and charity organizations, referred to as public-private financ-
ing partnerships, with agreements on the drug availability and product price, seem most
promising.[193;194] This approach is what accelerated the development of the malaria vac-
cine, Mosquirix1.
New initiatives to help reduce patents’ limiting accessibility and affordability effects are cur-
rently being developed.[32] GSK announced a graduated approach, stating that it would not
defend patents in the poorest countries, and transfer licences to generic manufacturers in
LMIC using the World Bank classification.[207–209] This approach would increase access to
new drugs without limiting profitability in high-income countries.
Public-private partnerships could also stimulate commercially unattractive but essential
therapeutic innovations in high-income countries. Exemplary is the clear societal need for new
antibiotics, given the increasing prevalence of multi-drug-resistant bacteria. The possible gains
for the industry are too low to make innovation economically viable.[200] The population base
for a new antibiotic is small, because it would be the option of last resort. In addition, the
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length of antibiotic treatment is short, making the volume of the market very small.[210]
Extremely high prices could compensate for this situation, but it is doubtful whether society
would be willing to pay. Due to low incentives in the current market, governments are tempted
to impose regulation to make antibiotic development more attractive,[206;210;211] as is in
place for orphan drugs. We recommend that this policy also includes strict drug pricing condi-
tions, and that it is accompanied by antimicrobial stewardship to prevent the overuse and mis-
use of the new antibiotic drug.
5.3. Me-too drugs, R&D resources
Me-too drugs or follow-on drugs are drugs with minor chemical variations relative to a drug
already on the market within a given therapeutic class.[173] These drugs are highly controver-
sial since they often cost roughly the same as the first-in-class drugs, but offer few relevant
therapeutic improvements.[68;69] Me-too drugs are seen as an ineffective consumption of
R&D resources and diminishing incentives for innovation[24].
Another side of the argument is that me-too drugs increase choice, and make treatment
available for certain groups, or help match a drug’s pharmacokinetics, effectiveness or side
effects in specific populations.[24;68] Me-too drugs are also a consequence of R&D races
between multiple companies developing drugs for the same indication, so they are inherent to
a competitive system.[173;212] Given that a first-in-class drug has a significant advantage in
market share and costs, this competition forces companies to speed up innovation[69].
Studies suggest that the price of me-too drugs only falls after the third introduction.
[93;173] Where the first movers compete over quality only, the drugs introduced later compete
over price to overcome the disadvantage of being a new drug with no clinical record.[212]
This holds for Gilead Sciences’ hepatitis C drugs as well, where MSD is competing with Zepa-
tier1 with a price tag that is 40% lower than the first-in-class[115;213]
5.4. Lack of systematic research into policy effectiveness
Various policies related to drug prices with roughly the same aim have been introduced
around the world, but comparing the effectiveness across policies appears difficult.[41] Policies
often lack a scientific basis, and an evaluation after the policy is introduced is not always per-
formed, let alone in a standardized way.[41;84;165] Insights on the long-term policy effects of
for instance value-based (QALY-guided) pricing are particularly scarce,[165] which causes
some countries to pay unnecessarily high prices for medicines.[35;163] Even regulatory guide-
lines are implemented without evaluation,[41] which causes some to ask for lowered regula-
tion to speed up innovation[66] and others to ask for more regulation for additional safety.
Unfortunately, both groups lack the evidence to back their case. Given the current trends in
big data analytics, better monitoring of the effects of drugs with respect to health outcomes
and the effects of policy on pricing should be possible.[89] Health Technology Assessment
methodologies (HTA) could be used to strengthen evaluation of policy measures. Further-
more, the option of involving regulatory gatekeepers of safety and effectiveness like the FDA
and the EMA in drug pricing policies should be considered more seriously. Like drugs, drug
policy must be evidence-based[110]
5.5. Justification of drug prices
Life expectancy has gone up by 30 years in just a century in high-income countries.[77] It can
be stated that innovation is always expensive, as seen in other new technologies, and once the
price of innovation has been paid, generics make innovative treatments widely available. Revo-
lutions in biotechnology, nanotechnology, biophysics and genome sequencing have moved
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precision medicine from the bench to the bedside,[53;89;214] yielding a burst of innovation in
medicine.[30;42;75;160] This helps to explain the large number of new and expensive targeted
therapies that have come to the market recently. Cancer mortality has been reduced by 20% in
the last two decades[77] through the introduction of new drugs, but that is also due to screen-
ing, prevention, vaccination and surgical improvements[58].
Steep pricing strategies are historically an oncological phenomenon,[91;214] and recently
prices are rising to even higher levels.[94] This is peculiar, since some oncological drugs offer
only small benefits.[5] In addition to this low effect, oncological drugs are frequently priced so
high that they are not cost-effective.[215] What makes the situation more financially challeng-
ing is that cancer drugs are often more effective in combinations,[75] thus making therapy
cost the sum of the drugs.[98] Debates about this situation have usually ended in the consensus
that patients cannot be denied new cancer treatments simply because of costs,[214] so eventu-
ally most cancer drugs have been reimbursed despite the high costs. But this is no longer sus-
tainable given the steadily growing patient populations with cancer and stagnating health
budgets.
As more treatments become possible, expectations rise.[58] Diseases that were a death sen-
tence decades ago are now treatable, and leaving them untreated is not acceptable. With
increasing possibilities come increased demands and increasing costs[216].
These innovations have allowed for more personalized diagnosis and cures, leading to pre-
cision or personal medicine, aimed at highly stratified patient populations. This gives better
outcomes, but given the often smaller populations that qualify for a treatment (and thus
smaller volumes of sales) prices are high to generate adequate revenue.[214] This shift from
blockbuster to niche buster will make many untreatable diseases treatable, but costs for the
healthcare sector will continue to rise[217].
5.6. Patient-assistance programs and list prices
Companies that raise prices often defend their actions by stating that patients who cannot
afford the drugs are offered assistance in the form of patient assistance programs programmes
in Western countries.[156] These programs allow patients to apply for the drugs at reduced or
no cost, if they are uninsured and live below a certain income level.[114] The income level is
set so that many patients on normal wages don’t qualify, so that drug prices can result in cata-
strophic spending.[114] Furthermore, patient-assistance programs increase the workload for
general practitioners’ assistants, since they often require many forms.[140] The costs to the
healthcare system are still unnecessarily large, and are shifted from patients to insurance com-
panies.[141;154;218] These programs basically allow companies to sponsor the purchase of
their own drugs[147].
Another argument for defending high prices is that pharmaceutical companies do not actu-
ally charge list prices for drugs. Hospitals and insurers often negotiate discounts on drug list
prices,[142;156;219] and sometimes up to 50%.[141] However, drug prices worldwide remain
at unrealistically high levels, since examples of annually raising prices (or prices rising after
selling licences) to more than double the original price are plentiful[114;220].
In some cases, companies provide free drugs for a small market simply because they feel
they are morally obliged to do so. These are usually small companies who do not want to invest
in regulatory approval procedures.[70] Larger companies see it as a moral obligation to maxi-
mize sales volumes and profits, reach patients and secure future investments in research, con-
tinue innovation,[94] and pay their stock holders.
Trying to defend high spending on pharmaceuticals, companies often point out that in the
US only $300 billion is spent annually on prescription medicines compared to the $1 trillion
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that is spent on hospital care.[2;184] Therefore, compared to total healthcare spending, US
pharmaceutical costs are just 10% of the total health care budget, which is roughly the same
throughout Europe.[184] This number has remained constant for over 50 years.[77;221] Thus,
all other healthcare costs, such as hospitals and general practitioners’ costs, have risen at the
same rate as pharmaceutical costs.[39] It is simply easier for governments to reduce drug bud-
gets than to reduce hospital staff wages or restructure inefficient healthcare infrastructures.[2]
However, this still does not justify high drug prices. Just because other parts of the system are
not functioning as efficiently as possible, does not mean pharmaceutical companies should be
increasing prices at the same rate.
5.7 Methodological notes
This paper used both scientific publications and newspaper articles from several selected news-
papers. The selection of those sources allowed for a comprehensive view on the subject of drug
pricing. Clear differences in focus between the newspaper articles and scientific publications
were observed.
The newspaper articles tended to focus on public opinion in one country based on one
event, with examples and personal stories about the impact of high drug prices on patients’
lives. A thorough analysis on causes and policies of drug pricing was often missing, and a
rather mono-dimensional conclusion was frequently offered that pharmaceutical companies
choose to keep the prices high for their own exorbitant profits.
The journal articles offered more policy-focussed analyses of the causes of and solutions to
high drug pricing. They more frequently covered in-depth discussions of single policy mea-
sures per country and their proposed or measured effect, but often left the patient perspective
out.
In conclusion, the combination of both peer-reviewed scientific papers and newspaper arti-
cles allowed for a significantly contextualized evidence based conclusion. The mixed-method
approach yielded deeper insights into the problem area of high drug pricing and sustainable
drug markets than one of the two individual methods would have been able to achieve alone.
6. Conclusion
The current rise in drug prices worldwide is making healthcare unaffordable even in high-
income countries. Apart from historic changes in the drug life cycle dynamics, price-volume
proportions, and a transition from “one-size-fits-all” to more stratified precision medicine
approaches, this problem is due to patent-induced monopoly positions, unintended conse-
quences of drug and reimbursement policies and competitive market failure. This situation
threatens to disturb the fragile compromise between the basic human right for affordable
access to healthcare and the utilitarian protection of inventions to incentivize innovation. The
current pricing spiral will only stop through well-designed regulatory interventions and mea-
sures around drug pricing on a national and transnational levels. Access to medicines needs to
be central to any policy intervention discussion—something that can be overlooked when gov-
ernments are arguing for lower health care costs to reduce spending, while the pharmaceutical
industry is repeating the argument for competitive pricing to reimburse their R&D costs.
Many options to regulate the pharmaceutical market have been tried, some with better suc-
cess than others. It is clear that reference pricing–both internal and external–and incentivizing
physicians and pharmacists are the fastest, most effective and most reviewed options. Transna-
tional cooperation, for example through the European Union, African Union, World Bank or
WHO, would help reduce drug prices with increased bargaining power, and could potentially
reduce administrative costs. Apart from creating collective negotiating power transnational
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cooperation would also stimulate exchanging trial data, sharing patient records and improving
evaluation methods. A global framework for cooperation among drug regulatory authorities
(e.g. FDA and EMA) would increase those benefits even more, and could be further amplified
by reinforcing the existing WHO framework that already helps to reduce drug prices by means
of an essential medicines list, which facilitates compulsory licensing.
Reduced healthcare spending is thought to reduce incentives for innovation, but given the
current double-digit profit margins, industrial incomes could be lower without harming the
industry’s outlooks. Public-private partnerships, in which charity funds are used to sponsor
research in exchange for lower prices, could significantly help direct spending decisions on
research away from primarily financial motives towards what is best for society.
Value-based pricing is a promising but also risky option that is already being used by some
countries to reduce costs. The (inter-)national public debates about how much a QALY should
cost and the regulatory and policy debates about whether and how to continue with the QALY
appraisal tools still have to reach a conclusion. Until consensus is reached, drug companies
will continue to strategically use the QALY and/or ICER thresholds to boost their profits. Gov-
ernments should take this into account while continuing to deploy sophisticated ICER-based
compensation models in the era of precision medicine.
In conclusion, the recent rise in drug prices is caused by uncontrolled market dynamics,
changes in life-cycle dynamics and unanticipated policy side-effects. There is a wide range of
policy tools to reduce drug prices available through various mechanisms. The most effective
options are reference pricing and incentivizing physicians and pharmacists, whereas for the
long term value-based and outcome-based pricing next to public-private partnerships are
most promising developments. The challenge is, of course, how to strike a balance between
rewarding investments in innovation, achieving reasonable drug pricing for governments and
securing equitable access to medicines.
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